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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The citations and arguments set-forth within the instant Reply Brief are intended by Appellant to be 
supplemental to those citations and that argument originally advanced within Appellant's Opening 
Brief, dated August 28, 2017, filed of record herein. Therefore, it is not the intent that the instant 
Reply Brief respond to each of the various issues, arguments or citations advanced by or within 
Respondents' Brief, to the extent that any such response would simply duplicate citations or 
argument previously made by Appellant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT WITH CITATIONS 
I. Reply to Certain of Respondents' Understanding of Relevant Facts and/or 
Misrepresentation of Fact Within Respondents' Brief 
It is not counsel's intent to "nit-pick" to the extent of addressing each factual representation 
of Respondents to which counsel disagrees. Most certainly, counsel recognizes that "poetic license" 
affords certain latitude in arguments and/or representations made upon behalf of a party. However, 
when a representation of fact is not supported of record or where a party's argument is premised 
upon a misrepresentation of fact, such should be noted. Appellant does so, as follows: 
1. Page 4 of Respondents' Brief: 
Respondents assert that, 
Claimant's counsel entered into an attorney fee agreement with Blue Cross ofldaho 
to prosecute its subrogation claim arising out of the November 2013 right TKA. 
This claim was prosecuted on behalf of Blue Cross because claimant did not bill 
Surety for his right TKA. 
At page 8 of Respondents' Brief, it asserts, 
... claimant did not request that Surety pay for (his right TKA) .... Instead, claimant 
billed his right TKA through his personal health insurer, Blue Cross of Idaho. As a 
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result, claimant's counsel only pursued recovery of Blue Cross' subrogation interest 
in this case. 
Again, at page 29 of Respondents' Brief, it asserts, 
... this case and appeal was prosecuted solely for the benefit of claimant's subrogee, 
Blue Cross of Idaho,... . In other words, there would be no tangible benefit to the 
claimant from the prosecution of this medical benefits claim and subsequent appeal. 
The only person that stands to benefit from this appeal is claimant's counsel who ... 
signed an attorney fee agreement with Blue Cross in which he would receive an 
attorney fee if he prevailed. 
These representations by Respondents/Respondents' counsel are partially correct. As noted 
at pages 1-2 of Appellant's Opening Brief, Charles LeRoy Hartgrave, Claimant-Appellant herein 
(hereafter referenced as "LeRoy") had been employed by Defendant-Employer, City of Twin Falls, 
for 38 years, and had become friends with his co-workers and supervisors, such that he was a 
"reluctant" participant in the underlying adversarial Title 72 proceeding. It was by reason of this 
fact that LeRoy entered into the Modified Lump Sum Agreement (hereinafter referenced as MLSA) 
with Respondents, settling his underlying Title 72 claims against the advice of his attorney, who was 
of the opinion that the settlement did not fairly compensate LeRoy to the extent provided by Title 
72. 
Throughout the underlying proceedings, Respondents, Defendants therein, disputed and 
denied the compensability of LeRoy's right knee presentment, generally, and specifically the 
compensability of his right TKA, as being either directly or indirectly related to his two industrial 
left knee injuries, the compensability of which were conceded by Respondents. Respondents' 
Answer to Complaint, regarding both the February 3, 2009 and August 23, 2012 claims, specifically 
denied liability for any injury to LeRoy' s right knee. R., pp. 10 and 12. The State Insurance Fund, 
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Surety herein, did not process and pay for LeRoy' s right TKA because it was not billed, but because 
Respondents, at all times herein, denied any responsibility for LeRoy' s right knee presentment. 
The underlying claim was prosecuted upon behalf of LeRoy. Blue Cross, which processed 
and paid certain of the billings related to LeRoy's right TKA pursuant to the terms and conditions 
of its contract of insurance, was subrogated therein to the extent of those payments. 
As a practical matter, any settlement of the underlying claim between LeRoy and 
Respondents was precluded by Blue Cross' subrogation claim unless Blue Cross' interests were 
protected by and within the settlement or the settlement specifically excluded Blue Cross' interests. 
The MLSA entered into by and between LeRoy and Respondents excluded Blue Cross' subrogated 
interests. Following the MLSA, Blue Cross' interests were the subject of the Title 72 proceedings 
which culminated in the Commission's August 23, 2017, decision from which the instant Appeal 
was taken. However, the instant Appeal was not taken by reason of Blue Cross' interests, but was 
taken for the benefit of LeRoy. 
The underlying, principal and primary objective of the instant Appeal is to protect and benefit 
LeRoy. Of record herein is the fact that certain of the consideration paid by Respondents to LeRoy 
pursuant to the MLSA was the total ofLeRoy's out-of-pocket costs, in the form of his co-pay and/or 
deductibles, related to the right TKA. At the time of the MLSA, LeRoy had been released from 
medical care following right TKA and there was no hint or suggestion that he was at risk for other 
or prospective procedures involving or related to right knee presentment. 
During counsel's review of the Commission's June 23, 2017, decision with LeRoy, LeRoy 
noted that he had experienced difficulty with the right TKA and had re-presented to his orthopedic 
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surgeon, who advised that the right TKA had "failed," such that it was probable that LeRoy would 
require a repeat procedure, which would be significantly more complicated and expensive than had 
been the original TKA. LeRoy stressed that in light of the Commission's June 23, 2017, decision, 
he was greatly concerned that further required right knee procedures would result in his 
responsibility for co-pays and/or deductibles which he and his family could not afford, and 
specifically requested counsel to file the instant appeal. See Affidavit of Berry in Support of 
Claimant's Motion for Re-Opening of Claim in Order to Correct Manifest Injustice, dated January 
25, 2017, at paragraphs 6-11. R., pp. 88-90. Such was most certainly within the knowledge of 
Respondents' counsel, Mr. Augustine. The above representations made upon behalf of Respondents 
were materially false and obviously intended to bias this Court against the instant Appeal. 
2. Page 6 of Respondents' Brief: Thereat and repeated thereafter is the understanding 
of Respondents/Respondents' counsel that Dr. McKee recommended and the surety approved a left 
TKA, which LeRoy underwent on March 13, 2013. Actually, Dr. McKee did initially recommend 
a left TKA for LeRoy but subsequently determined that an arthroscopic procedure offered potential 
for greater benefit, which the surety authorized and Dr. McKee performed on March 13, 2013. Ex. 
C.3., pp. 95-112. 
3. Page 7 of Respondents' Brief: Respondents misrepresent that LeRoy testified that, 
" ... after he stopped using the crutches following his March 2013 left TKA ( should be left 
arthroscopy), his right knee was 'extremely painful,' he had 'trouble bending it,' and it would 'lock 
up' on him," citing Hartgrave Depo., p. 64, LL. 13-23. (Emphasis added.) 
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At page 27 of Respondents' Brief, Respondents' represent that, "[t]he timing of the onset of 
the claimant's symptoms in Dr. McKee's August 2013 release of the claimant to return to full duty 
establishes that his activities and daily living and work activities led to the documented onset of right 
knee pain in November 2013." (Emphasis added.) 
Such representations were intended to project that LeRoy's knee symptomatology which 
resulted in his right TKA manifested "after he stopped using the crutches following his March 2013 
left TKA," and did not occur until November, 2013. Such is irreconcilable with the record. With 
respect to LeRoy's onset/manifestation of right knee symptomatology, the "timing" was set by Mr. 
Augustine's inquiry to LeRoy, which was "[b]y the time you get off your crutches .... " Hartgrave 
Depo., p. 64, L. 13. It is clear that by LeRoy's response to that inquiry, the onset/manifestation of 
right knee symptomatology was suffered while he remained on crutches following his March 23, 
2013, left arthroscopic procedure. LeRoy's testimony was, 
[ a ]fter the two surgeries on my left knee, it changed the way I walk and different 
things like that. I started having a lot of trouble with this right knee. Being on 
crutches for six weeks, totally on the right knee, it just caused all sorts of problems . 
. . . this right knee never came back after I got back to work. It still gave me severe 
problems ... .it just wouldn't come back to what it used to be before the six weeks on 
the crutches. It wasn't - - it just wasn't working. (Emphasis added.) 
Hartgrave Depo., p. 62, L. 20-p. 63, L. 11; and, p. 64, LL. 18-21. 
Further, Mr. Augustine's representation that Dr. McKee's August 2013 release of LeRoy to 
return to work was at "full-duty" is shy of the mark. Rather, Dr. McKee's actual release of LeRoy 
to return to work was with permanent restrictions of "no squatting, kneeling and limit lifting to 50 
pounds." Ex. C.3., p. 145. 
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4. Page 10 of Respondents' Brief: Here, Respondents assert that at the time ofLeRoy's 
first IME by Dr. Tallerico, in December, 2010, Dr. Tallerico then considered LeRoy a candidate for 
a right TKA. Such is simply not true. Rather, Dr. Tallerico, on cross examination, testified that the 
decision to proceed with a TKA or not is pain driven on the part of the patient. He would never 
recommend a TKA based only upon diagnostic films. Rather, if LeRoy would have presented to him 
as a patient with respect to his left knee and diagnostic studies had been performed on both knees, 
upon observing that the degenerative joint disease appeared worse on the right than the left, if LeRoy 
would have told Dr. Tallerico, as he did Dr. McKee, that he did not then have an issue with respect 
to the right knee, Dr. Tallerico would not have recommended a right TKA at that point in time. 
Tallerico Depo., p. 41, L. 1-p. 43, L. 13. 
5. Page 11 of Respondents' Brief: Respondents here represent that Dr. Tallerico, 
Respondents' IME physician, examined Leroy and, " ... subsequently reviewed claimant's diagnostic 
studies and Dr. McKee's interpretation of the films. He testified that the films from November 2013 
showed end-stage arthritis in the right knee .... " It is true that Dr. Tallerico did conduct an IME upon 
LeRoy's left knee upon November 12, 2013. However, Dr. Tallerico did not then or thereafter 
review LeRoy's diagnostic studies, but only Dr. McKee's interpretation thereof. In fact, following 
LeRoy's initial left knee evaluation by Dr. Tallerico, on December 16, 2010, Dr. Tallerico did not 
personally review any of Leroy's diagnostic film or studies. Tallerico Depo., p. 18, LL. 2-13; and, 
p. 25, L. 20-p. 26, L. 20. 
6. Pages 13-14 of Respondents' Brief: Perhaps most damning on the part of 
Respondents is Respondents' misrepresentation of Dr. Tallerico's testimony. Respondents 
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affirmatively represent that Dr. Tallerico " ... acknowledged that if the claimant's medical records 
documented the onset of right knee pain 'soon after' this left knee TKA ( should be arthroscopic 
procedure), he could change his opinion on causation," citing Tallerico Depo., p. 22, LL. 15-24 
(Emphasis added). Rather, Dr. Tallerico's testimony was, 
Q. Assuming that there was documented in the medical record that while 
(LeRoy) was non-weight-bearing, lets say, during the four months prior to his 
knee replacement that he had a sudden increase in right knee pain, would that 
change your opinion? 
A. Yes. 
Tallerico Depo., p. 22, LL. 15-20. 
Again, it was not counsel's intent to "nit-pick" Respondents' Brief within the context of 
representations made therein which were either not supported of record or, more significantly, were 
in direct conflict therewith. Quite the opposite. However, the above references to Respondents' 
Brief were believed by counsel to be significant and most certainly worthy of reference within 
Appellant's Reply Brief. 
II. Response to Certain of the Argument Advanced by Respondents 
As noted by Respondents' Brief, LeRoy' s right knee claim failed before the Commission only 
because he failed to complain to Dr. McKee of right knee symptomatology within the four to six 
week period following his second left knee industrial knee surgery. Such would have afforded the 
"documentation" for Dr. Tallerico to express that LeRoy's manifestation of right knee 
symptomatology which resulted in right TKA was by reason of his left industrial knee injuries status-
post surgeries. 
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Respondents assert at page 29 of Respondents' Brief that," ... the fact that there was no 
contemporaneous medical record which would have corroborated the temporality of (LeRoy' s) knee 
complaints with the claimant's testimony ... (is) fatal to the claimant's causation argument, .... " As 
the Commission noted within its June 23, 2017, decision, 
... the argument is that Claimant's pre-existing right knee condition was aggravated by the 
industrial accident by this path: Claimant suffered a left knee injury which required surgery. 
During his convalescence, Claimant was required to use crutches and this use of crutches 
caused a gait alternation which aggravated his right knee condition. If this causal chain finds 
support in the medical record, Claimant's right knee injury would be compensable pursuant 
to the 'compensable consequences' doctrine. (Emphasis added.) 
R., pp. 185-186. By the "medical record," the Commission references Dr. Tallerico's IME reports 
and/or the office dictation of LeRoy' s orthopedic surgeon, Dr. McKee, documenting LeRoy making 
complaint of right knee symptomatology during or soon after his six week period on crutches 
following his second left knee industrial arthroscopic surgery. 
Rhetorically speaking, upon consideration of the facts of record in this matter and applying 
the same to controlling Idaho statute and/or case precedent, why should the absence of 
documentation within the medical records of LeRoy expressing complaint of right knee 
symptomatology close in time to the onset of that symptomatology be fatal to his claim? Clearly, 
it should not. LeRoy testified that, 
[a]fter the two surgeries on my left knee, it changed the way I walk and different 
things like that. I started having a lot of trouble with this right knee. Being on 
crutches for six weeks, totally on the right knee, it just caused all sorts of problems . 
... (The right knee) was in extreme pain. I was having trouble bending it. It just was 
at the point where I couldn't get around anymore ... .I had to be careful going up steps 
on crutches and different things like that .... My knee never, this right knee never 
came back after I got back to work. It still gave me severe problems. . . .It was 
extremely painful. I was having trouble bending it. It just wouldn't come back to 
what it used to be before the six weeks on the crutches. It wasn't - it just wasn't 
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working ... .It would try to lock up on me. It wouldn't -you know, it was painful. 
I couldn't bend it. ... (The right knee) was swollen. I had walked on it for six weeks 
with the crutches. So it had just taken its toll. 
Hartgrave Depo., p. 62, L. 20-p. 64, L. 23. 
In considering LeRoy's testimony, the Commission referred to the same as " ... Claimant's 
subjective opinion and testimony regarding what caused the pain and when that pain occurred." R., 
p. 187, ,r 42. The Commission has previously.held that it " ... does not expect a claimant to have 
medical knowledge without medical training. He or she is not legally bound to his impression of 
causation." Cook V. Ashley Inn, LLC and Employers Compensation Insurance, I.C. 2009-025203, 
filed January 30, 2013. Most certainly, LeRoy is not medically trained and without supporting 
medical opinion, his subjective opinion as to the cause of the manifestation of his right knee 
symptomatology could be suspect. However, his knowledge of and testimony describing when that 
pain manifested is unrebutted. 
In Niebuhr v. Aapex Construction, Inc., and Liberty Northwest, I.C. 2006-513568, filed 
September 28, 2011, which presented with similar facts, the Commission noted that that claimant's 
medical records did not document her complaints of neck symptomatology related to her industrial 
injury " ... when she was visiting a medical professional for another unrelated problem." (Emphasis 
added.) In that case, the Commission determined that," ... the six-or-more months' delay in recorded 
neck symptoms does not prove the absence of causation," and accepted the testimony of that 
claimant's treating physician expressing favorable causation opinion over that of an IME panel. See 
,r,r 60-62; and, 66-67, at page 16-17. Again, rhetorically speaking, who else but LeRoy could testify 
as to when and following what his right knee symptomatology manifested. 
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In rejecting Dr. McKee's favorable causation opinion, the Commission determined that, "Dr. 
McKee's changed opinion appears to be founded almost entirely upon Claimant's subjective and late 
self-reporting." (Emphasis added.) Within the same paragraph, the Commission found that Dr. 
Tallerico "unequivocally opined" that LeRoy' s need for right TKA was unrelated to his left knee 
industrial injuries. R., p. 188, ,r 44. These findings by the Commission are absent support by 
substantial and competent evidence of record and clearly establish that the Commission failed to 
make proper application of law to the evidence of record in reaching the same. 
First, again addressing LeRoy's sworn deposition testimony, which the Commission 
dismissed and believed insufficient for Dr. McKee's deposition testimony supporting causation, such 
testimony is uncontradicted and thusly must be accepted as true, absent the same being inherently 
improbable or rendered improbable by facts and circumstances disclosed at hearing. Piersto,ffv. 
Gray's Auto Shop, 58 Idaho 438, 74 P.2d 171,175 (Idaho 1937);Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 
603 P.2d 575, 581-82 (Idaho 1979); and, Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700,963 P.2d 383, 386 
(Idaho 1998). For the Commission to ignore/reject this testimony, the testimony must be inherently 
improbable or rendered improbable by facts and circumstances disclosed at hearing. It most certainly 
was not. 
LeRoy's testimony as to his on-set/manifestation of right knee symptomatology following 
the second industrial left knee arthroscopic surgery was considered by his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. 
McKee, who stated within his August 28, 2015, report that" .. .I feel that (LeRoy' s) industrial injuries 
caused an aggravation to his right knee pain. Had there not been worsening symptoms we would not 
have proceeded with total knee arthroplasty. Therefore, yes, I believe that his industrial injuries 
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moved up his need for total knee arthroplasty on the right." Ex. C.3.c., p. 200. In his deposition, 
Dr. McKee's sworn testimony explains that, upon consideration of the "history" provided by LeRoy 
within his sworn testimony, 
A. Well, I believe that (LeRoy' s) need for a knee replacement occurred earlier 
because of aggravation from being on crutches. 
Q. Okay. With regard to the alteration of gait because of the left knee, would 
that affect the weight bearing load on the right knee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In what regard? 
A. Its just going to put more pressure on that knee when ambulating, even after 
being off crutches. 
McKee Depo., p. 12, L. 19-p. 13, L. 4. In terms of medical probabilities, Dr. McKee's testimony 
was, 
Q. Doctor, with the exception of the altered gait and the sequela from the left 
knee injuries and the two surgeries, and, again, honing in upon the March 
2013 surgery, can you think of any other potential cause for the exacerbation 
on Mr. Hartgrave's right knee symptomatology having greater probability 
than that altered gait following the 2013 surgery to cause Mr. Hartgrave's 
symptomatology? 
A. No. 
McKee Depo., p. 14, L. 23-p. 15, L. 6. 
The Commission concluded that Dr. McKee's opinions set-forth within his August 28, 2015, 
report as well as his sworn testimony had "changed" from those expressed within Dr. McKee's 
report of July 29, 2014, at Ex. C. 3. a., p. 192. That report by Dr. McKee was responsive to counsel's 
July 1,2014,inquiry,ofrecordatEx. C.3.a.(1),pp.193-197. Ofnote, that five page correspondence 
from counsel failed to attach LeRoy's explanation/description of how and when his right knee 
symptomatology manifested. Within his July 29, 2014, report, Dr. McKee simply stated that, "Mr. 
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Hartgrave had severe arthritis in his right knee that was noted on his initial visit in 2009. He would 
have required a total knee arthroplasty regardless of his industrial injuires." 
It is of critical importance that Dr. McKee's opinion as stated within the July 29, 2014, report 
be compared with, of and to his report of August 28, 2015, and sworn deposition testimony. Not 
having benefit of LeRoy's sworn description of the "timing" of manifestation of his right knee 
symptomatology, Dr. McKee's July 29, 2014, report simply states that LeRoy " ... would have 
required a total knee arthroplasty regardless of his industrial injuries." No one disputes that fact. 
What is significant about this opinion of Dr. McKee is that there is no indication of a time-line as 
to when LeRoy' s right TKA would have been medically anticipated to be required absent his two 
industrial left knee injuries. Of note, Dr. McKee is board-certified in orthopedics whose practice 
includes sports medicine,joint replacement and trauma, with 50% of that practice involving knees. 
McKee Depo., p. 4, LL. 9-20. There is no indication that Dr. McKee does IME examinations. Dr. 
McKee testified that when LeRoy presented to him in November, 2013, status-post on-set of right 
knee symptomatology, the "when, where and why" pertaining to that on-set was not an issue from 
his perspective, and did not become an issue until counsel's inquiry to the doctor following the right 
TKA. McKee Depo., p. 15, LL. 7-20. Obviously, as Dr. McKee did not perceive the circumstances 
regarding the on-set/manifestation of LeRoy' s right knee symptomatology to be an issue, there would 
have been no discussion of the same between Dr. McKee and LeRoy absent LeRoy initiating the 
same. 
Prior to the initial February 3, 2009, industrial left knee injury, LeRoy's only interaction with 
and/or exposure to workers' compensation was by reason of an August 6, 1996 facial soft tissue 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-12 
injury, for which he presented to a medical provider and suffered no residuals; and, a January 9, 
2003, injury to his nose, for which he again presented to a provider for treatment, and suffered no 
residuals. Ex. 0.1.a., pp. 560-561, referencing Claimant's Answer to Defendants' Interrogatory No. 
24. LeRoy would most certainly not be anticipated to understand the nuances within the doctrine 
of "compensable consequences," and thusly that he should discuss the whens, hows and whys of his 
on-set of right knee symptomatology with either Dr. McKee or Dr. Tallerico. Again, Cook (supra) 
expressed that the Commission " ... does not expect a Claimant to have medical knowledge without 
medical training. He or she is not legally bound to his impression of causation." 
As noted within Appellant's Opening Brief, none of LeRoy's IME presentments to Dr. 
Tallerico were regarding his right knee. Dr. Tallerico was not a treating physician for LeRoy. Dr. 
Tallerico testified that, "I probably did at least a cursory exam of (LeRoy's) right knee ... (which 
would) ... not (be) as thorough as the accepted body part for the claim .... " Tallerico Depo., p. 12, 
LL. 19-23; and, p. 28, LL. 1-9. Thusly, both from the perspective of Dr. Tallerico and LeRoy, the 
right knee was not a subject for discussion and/or examination. Further, as noted by Dr. Tallerico, 
LeRoy " .. .is tough. He doesn't complain a lot." Tallerico Depo., p. 71, LL. 3-5. Dr. McKee agreed 
that LeRoy was tough and stoic, such that it would therefore be reasonable to assume that LeRoy 
thought that after he was off crutches and his gait disturbance relative thereto had resolved, his right 
knee symptomatology would abate, and thusly there was no need to complain. McKee Depo., p. 31, 
L. 17-p. 32, L. 15. Revisiting LeRoy's sworn deposition testimony confirms that such was exactly 
the scenario. 
A. After the two surgeries on my left knee, it changed the way I walk and ... I 
started having a lot of trouble with this right knee .... This right knee never 
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came back after I got back to work. It still gave me severe problems ... .It just 
wouldn't come back to what it used to be before the six weeks on the 
crutches. It wasn't - it just wasn't working ... .I hadn't had any plans of 
having anything done with the right knee. I told (Dr. McKee) I was was 
having a lot of trouble with it, and he checked it out. ... (Dr. McKee) said it 
wouldn't get any better. (Emphasis added.) 
Hartgrave Depo., p. 62, L. 20-p. 65, L. 23. 
Recall, Dr. Tallerico, Respondents' hired IME physician, described LeRoy as " ... obviously 
a very hardworking and straight-forward individual who has no secondary gain issues." (Ex. G.J., 
p. 278); "Once again, it is obvious that Mr. Hartgrave is a hardworking individual with no secondary 
gain issues." (Ex. G.5., p. 308); that LeRoy " ... was obviously straight-forward, that he was honest, 
that he was hard-working and that he exhibited no signs whatsoever of symptom magnification." 
(Tallerico Depo., p. 28, L. 22-p. 29, L. 3); that if LeRoy were to have told Dr. Tallerico something, 
Dr. Tallerico " ... would have believed it. " (Tallerico Depo., p. 29, LL. 4-8); and, that Dr. Tallerico 
foundLeRoy" ... to be forthright, straight-forward, honest. .. (and) a stand-up guy." (TallericoDepo., 
p. 53, LL. 19-21). Again, rhetorically speaking, upon what basis does the Commission discredit 
LeRoy's sworn testimony as to the circumstances and "timing" of the on-set/manifestation of his 
right knee symptomatology? 
Within Finding 45 of the Commission's June 23, 2017, decision, the Commission concluded 
that Dr. Tallerico "unequivocally" testified that LeRoy' s need for right TKA was unrelated to his left 
knee industrial injuries. Simply and bluntly stated, he did not. Within paragraph 30 of its decision, 
the Commission characterized Dr. Tallerico's testimony as that he " ... might change his mind (on 
causation) if there was documentation that Claimant began complaining of right knee pain shortly 
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after his second left knee surgery and while he was non-weight bearing." R., pp. 182-183. Dr. 
Tallerico's actual testimony was, 
Q. Assuming that there was documented in the medical record that while 
(LeRoy) was non-weight-bearing, let's say, during the four months prior to 
his knee replacement that he had a sudden increase in right knee pain, would 
that change your ( causation) opinion? 
A. Yes. If it was documented clearly that soon after having the second left knee 
surgery that he came in for evaluation of the right knee, though he was post-
operative on the left. That would be important, obviously." 
Tallerico Depo., p. 22, LL. 15-20. The "documentation" to which Dr. Tallerico was referring was 
simply notation within either Dr. McKee's records or Dr. Tallerico's records that LeRoy had 
discussed his on-set/manifestation of right knee symptomatology. Tallerico Depo., p. 66, LL. 5-13. 
Thusly, had Dr. McKee perceived there being an "issue" regarding LeRoy's on-set/manifestation of 
right knee symptomatology; made inquiry to LeRoy; and, documented the same within his records, 
Dr. Tallerico's causation opinion would have been favorable to LeRoy. After all, both Drs. McKee 
and Tallerico had, each, had patients within their respective practices who presented exactly as did 
LeRoy, " ... who present with horrific osteoarthritic knees on film and yet have very little 
manifestation of complaint, of symptomatology, ... (and) something happens where, after that 
occurrence, those previous, for the most part, asymptomatic patients develop manifestation." 
Tallerico Depo., p. 45, L. 18-p. 46, L. 3. Dr. McKee sees " ... patients all the time that have no pain 
with severe arthritis, but something will set if off, whether it is an injury or a fall or Mr. Hartgrave's 
situation." (Emphasis added.) McKee Depo., p. 14, LL. 1-4. 
LeRoy's treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. McKee, expressed that upon consideration of the 
"history" provided by LeRoy's testimony, his need for right TKA was advanced in time by reason 
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of his altered gait from being on crutches for the six week period of time following LeRoy's second 
industrial left knee surgery. McKee Depo., p. 12, L. 3-p. 13, L. 10. Dr. McKee could think of no 
other potential cause for the exacerbation of LeRoy' s right knee symptomatology having greater 
probability than the altered gait following the 2013 left knee industrial surgery. McKee Depo., p. 
14, L. 23-p. 15, L. 6. Had Dr. Tallerico considered LeRoy's deposition testimony, his causation 
opinion would certainly have also been favorable to LeRoy. As earlier noted, Dr. Tallerico found 
LeRoy to be honest and would have believed him. 
For reasons undisclosed of record but certainly well understood (Respondents' "strategy" in 
manipulating/controlling the data upon which Dr. Tallerico would base his causation opinion), 
Respondents failed to provide Dr. Tallerico with LeRoy' s sworn deposition testimony describing the 
on-set/manifestation of right knee symptomatology. Tallerico Depo., p. 28, LL. 12-21. Dr. Tallerico 
did say that if LeRoy testified that after the second industrial left knee surgery and while he was non-
weight-bearing, that his right knee symptomatology flared up and never went back to baseline, that 
the manifestation would be within the time continuum supporting causal relation between the on-set 
of symptomatology and the industrial left knee surgery. Tallerico Depo., p. 47, LL. 11-13; and, p. 
48, LL. 2-12. However, when specifically asked to consider LeRoy's deposition testimony, Dr. 
Tallerico refused and responded, "why wasn't it (provided to me?) - again, I don't have that 
transcript. All I have are my four reports and the medical records, Dr. McKee's importantly, all of 
my opinions are formulated on that." (Emphasis added.) Tallerico Depo., p. 53, L. 3-p. 54, L. 4. 
Dr. Tallerico conceded that there was nothing within LeRoy's medical records which 
indicated that prior to his industrial left knee injuries, LeRoy complained of popping or cracking 
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(crepitus); was experiencing give-way, weakness or instability; was restricted in going up or down 
stairs, steps or ladders; experienced difficulty stooping, crawling, prolonged walking, walking over 
uneven surfaces or squatting; or, regarding any activity involving the right knee. Tallerico Depo., 
p. 37, LL. 6-14; and, p. 38, L. 16-p. 39, L. 20. Dr. Tallerico testified that for LeRoy to proceed with 
right TKA, he was experiencing a "different level" of pain, being ''tough." Tallerico Depo., p. 38, 
LL. 11-15. Dr. Tallerico concurred that, ultimately, the decision to proceed or not with TKA is pain 
driven on the part of the patient. TallericoDepo., p. 43, LL. 9-13. Not having had benefit of (and 
refusing to consider) LeRoy' s deposition testimony, Dr. Tallerico expressed that the" ... cause having 
greater probability for the increase in manifestation of Mr. Hartgrave's right knee during the six to 
eight weeks following the second left knee surgery than his two industrial accidents, inclusive of the 
left knee surgeries" was "coincidence." Tallerico Depo., p. 54, LL. 16-24. 
InAnderson v. Gamma Phi Beta Sorority and Continental Casualty Co., LC.2014-013005, 
filed June 7, 2016, the Commission was faced with an analogous claim, where that claimant's 
treating orthopedic surgeon expressed a favorable causation opinion, based upon " ... a temporal 
relationship between (the industrial event) and development of symptoms," and the opposing opinion 
of defendants' IME physician that that claimant's on-set/manifestation of symptomatology at the 
point in time experienced was "coincidence." In that claim, as here, defendants attacked the treating 
physician's causation opinion as " ... unfounded as he failed to cite supporting medical literature." 
In dismissing the same, the Commission determined that the treating physician's experience as a 
practicing orthopedic surgeon provided adequate support for his causation opinion, and accepted the 
same in finding that claimant's presentment compensable. It is respectfully submitted that the 
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"coincidence" opinion of Dr. Tallerico constitutes pure and simple speculation; flies in the face of 
the clear record herein; and, should be similarly rejected. Conversely, Dr. McKee, LeRoy's treating 
orthopedic surgeon, is the only physician expressing causation opinion upon receipt, review and 
consideration of all pertinent medical records and data, inclusive of the sworn testimony of LeRoy 
describing when, how and why his right knee symptomatology manifested and never returned to 
baseline, which, from a pain-driven perspective, required and resulted in right TKA. 
Upon multiple occasions throughout Respondents' Brief, Respondents emphasize the lack 
of "medical records" of either Dr. McKee or IME Physician Tallerico documenting that LeRoy 
complained of right knee manifestation between the March 13, 2013, second industrial left knee 
arthroscopy and LeRoy's re-presentment to Dr. McKee upon November 8, 2013. While the 
arguments set-forth within Appellant's Opening Brief as well as herein above are upon the 
assumption that LeRoy did not discuss his right knee manifestation with Drs. McKee or Tallerico 
during this time frame, it most certainly cannot be ruled-out that LeRoy did, in fact, do so, but that 
the physicians and/or their respective staff simply failed to record the same within the medical 
records. 
It is well known that medical records are not infallible. Mistakes and omissions occur. 
Further, irrespective of one's perception of duties and/or obligations, upon occasion individuals 
simply fail to do that which should be done, inclusive of making entries in medical records. 
First, regarding Dr. McKee and his office's records, it is Dr. McKee's medical assistant, not 
himself, who obtained the "chief complaint, clinical comments, pain assessment, vitals, injury 
information, (and) etcetera, from Mr. Hartgrave." McKee Depo., p. 18, LL. 11-16. At the time of 
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his deposition, Dr. McKee candidly conceded that he did not recall "every interaction" with LeRoy. 
Rather, his deposition testimony was given "relying on (his) medical records and the documentation 
of (LeRoy' s) symptoms to determine whether or not he was complaining of a specific symptom at 
that time." McKee Depo., p. 19, LL. 9-18. Unless Dr. McKee's medical assistant was astute and 
thorough enough to make inquiry regarding LeRoy' s right knee presentment at the time of LeRoy' s 
left knee presentments following the second industrial left knee surgery, Dr. McKee's records would 
be absent of the same, and thusly the "documentation" required by Dr. Tallerico would not exist. 
With respect to Dr. Tallerico, within his deposition he repeatedly testified as to the obligation 
of a physician to document a patient's complaints within the medical records. Tallerico Depo., p. 
69, L. 11-p. 70, L. 5. Interestingly enough, it appears that Dr. Tallerico imposes responsibilities and 
obligations upon other physicians that he, himself, fails to conform to. Reference is made to Dr. 
Tallerico's report flowing from his repeat IME examination of LeRoy of April 17, 2014, at Ex. G.6, 
pp. 311-325. Therein, Dr. Tallerico notes that LeRoy presented with left knee symptoms regarding 
which "shots were minimally effective." LeRoy had dull aching and near-constant pain on the 
medial aspect of his left knee, definitely worse doing some of his work activities. There was 
grinding and popping of the left knee. Exacerbating factors included prolonged standing and 
definitely repetitive climbing in and out of trucks. LeRoy also had a difficult time kneeling and 
squatting. In response to specific questions from the surety, Dr. Tallerico advised that LeRoy's 
condition was "fixed and stable"; and, that LeRoy" ... does not require any further medical treatment 
related to his industrial (left knee) injury." See responses to questions 3 and 4, Ex. G.6., p. 320. 
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At the time of his deposition, during cross-examination, Dr. Tallerico was asked whether, 
at the time of this IME examination, LeRoy would " ... have been a TKA candidate with regard to the 
left knee.?" Dr. Tallerico's response was, "I don't think so. I mean, I would have, perhaps, 
mentioned it if he was that bad .... and if (LeRoy) were my patient who came in and I did that knee 
scope on him, I would try a more conservative treatment for a little while." (Emphasis added.) 
Tallerico Depo., p. 61, LL. 1-19. Dr. Tallerico's testimony continued as, 
Q. From your records, as of the date of the 4/17/14 left IME, the MRI had 
documented a marked irregular cartilage loss and osteophyte formation. X-
rays confirmed significant osteoarthritic changes. 
He had aching and near constant pain. Worse at work activities. 
Grinding and popping without locking or give-away. Generally, upon such 
activities as prolonged standing, repetitive climbing in and out of vehicles, 
kneeling and squatting, mild crepitis, and an antalgic gait. 
At that juncture, with regard to the left, he would not have presented 
as a left TKA candidate? 
A. Is this my note? 
Q. That is how I viewed it. 
A. I am just trying to find it as you are talking. I am looking at 'Current 
Symptoms.' You are talking about 4/17 /14; is that correct? 
Q. Just one second here. I am looking at 4/17. Yes, sir, 'Current Symptoms.' 
A. Yes. 
Q. Left knee feels about the same as it did when I saw him in November. Shots, 
basically, without effect. Dull aching. Near constant pain. Definitely worse 
doing work activities. Grinding, popping, no locking or giving way. 
Exacerbating factors: Prolonged standing. Definitely repetitive 
climbing in and out of trucks. Difficult time kneeling and squatting because 
of pain. 
A. That's what he told me. Correct. I felt he was fixed and stable. He had 
exhausted treatment after that injury. Obviously, I didn't recommend a total 
knee replacement at that time. It wasn't a pointed guestion to that end, as far 
as. 'is he a candidate for total knee arthroplasty?' Sometimes that's put in the 
discussion or the cover letter. 
This may go back to what I mentioned about his work activities and 
nearing retirement and all of that. I am not sure that we even mentioned that 
in the report. (But) I am sure we talked about it. 
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In other words, I don't think he was quite interested in having this left 
knee replaced at that time. You can't make somebody do it if they don't want 
to. (Emphasis added.) 
Tallerico Depo., p. 61, L. 20-p. 63, L. 12. Thusly, although LeRoy presented at that juncture with 
far worse symptomatology than he had ever expressed to Dr. Tallerico regarding the right, Dr. 
Tallerico testified that he was not then a candidate for left TKA. Incredulously, irrespective of the 
good doctor's self-expressed obligations and responsibilities on the part of a physician to diligently 
record, and thusly document, discussions with the individual being examined, Dr. Tallerico states 
that he was " ... sure (he and LeRoy) talked about it," meaning a left TKA, but there is absolutely no 
reference to that discussion or, in fact, current or potential future need for left TKA within the 
doctor's April 17, 2014, report. Ironically, were left TKA to become a subsequent issue and a "new" 
IME physician was reviewing Dr. Tallerico' s records for "documentation" of discussion of the same, 
that documentation would not exist. 
The point of the above discussion is that physicians' records, including those of Dr. Tallerico, 
oft-times do not set-forth each and every discussion between the patient and the doctor (or the 
doctor's staff) regarding symptomatology and/or potential medical procedures, especially where that 
symptomatology did not involve the injury or condition for which the patient was then presenting. 
How unfair to LeRoy would it be if, in fact, he had discussed his on-set/manifestation of right knee 
symptomatology with Dr. McKee's staff, who then failed to record and thusly document the same 
ofrecord? 
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CONCLUSION 
LeRoy' s right knee claim should not and must not fail upon the basis that the medical records 
do not "document" that he made complaint to Drs. McKee or Tallerico of on-set/manifestation of 
right knee symptomatology prior to November 8, 2013. Rather, LeRoy's right knee claim can only 
fail if: 
1. LeRoy' s uncontroverted testimony regarding the on-set/manifestation of right knee 
symptomatology is determined to be "inherently improbable or rendered improbable by facts and 
circumstances disclosed at hearing." As previously discussed both within Appellant's Opening Brief 
and herein, it was neither. Rather, that testimony provided the history by and from which Dr. McKee 
found LeRoy' s change of gait following the second industrial left knee surgery to be the most 
probable cause for the onset-manifestation of LeRoy's right knee symptomatology which resulted 
in right TKA. Further, that testimony, had the same been considered by Dr. Tallerico, would have 
resulted in Dr. Tallerico's favorable causation opinion. 
2. That either Dr. Tallerico or Dr. McKee expressed opinion that LeRoy's on-
set/manifestation of right knee symptomatology could not be related to his altered gait following his 
second industrial left knee surgery. Neither doctor expressed such opinion. 
As above-discussed, both Drs. McKee and Tallerico testified that, in their respective 
individual practices, they have had patients who present with significant degenerative joint disease 
on film but which is relatively asymptomatic to their patient. Both doctors testified that following 
an event or occurrence, that previously mostly asymptomatic condition is exited or caused to 
manifest, such that the patient then experiences significant symptomatology from that previously 
relatively asymptomatic condition. 
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Citing multiple prior decisions, in Swenson v. Hiddleston & Son, Inc., and State Insurance 
Fund, I.C. 2004-518859, (filed May 6, 2009), at p. 11, ,r 33, the Commission noted that 
[i]t is not uncommon for a seemingly mild industrial injury to aggravate a progressive 
pre-existing degenerative condition. The Industrial Commission has held on 
numerous occasions that when the need for a total knee replacement surgery is 
hastened by an industrial injury, such surgery is compensable even if there is 
evidence to indicate that the claimant would eventually have needed the surgery in 
the absence of the compensable injury. 
The Court is invited to review and compare the Commission's decision in Swenson with the 
Commission's decision in the instant matter. It is respectfully submitted that upon similar but 
significantly weaker facts of record, Mr. Swenson prevailed whereas, in the instant matter, LeRoy 
did not. 
To enable to Court to understand the factual presentment before the Commission in Swenson 
and the analysis and decision of the Commission in that matter and to compare the same with the 
undisputed facts of record together with the Commission's analysis and decision before this Court 
upon instant appeal, attached as exhibit hereto is a true and correct copy of the Swenson decision. 
Upon repeated reading of the Commission's decision in Swenson, it is submitted that the only reason 
that that claimant prevailed and LeRoy did not is that, in Swenson, the Commission accepted that 
claimant's testimony at face value whereas in the instant matter, without basis of record or benefit 
of the Commission's rationale in doing so, the Commission ignored the mandate expressed by this 
Court in Pierstorff (supra), Dinneen (supra) and Wood (supra), and rejected LeRoy's undisputed 
testimony. Such constitutes clear error. 
InStevens-McAteev. Potlatch Corporation, 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d288 (2008), this Court 
recognized that whether an injury arose out of the course of employment is a question of fact to be 
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determined by the Commission. However, in noting that the Court must liberally construe the 
provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the employee in order to serve the humane 
purposes for which the law was promulgated, the Court overturned the Commission's decision 
finding that claimant's injury was unrelated to his employment, upon the grounds that that finding 
was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. In doing so, it appears that the Court did, 
in fact, review the evidence of record in that matter and concluded that, "[t]he record 
overwhelmingly indicates that McAtee herniated his disk during his work shift .... " It is submitted 
that justice together with the principles upon and for which Title 72 was promulgated demands the 
same review and result by the Court in the instant matter. 
Dr. Tallerico testified that for LeRoy to make the decision to proceed with right TKA, he was 
experiencing a "different level" of pain. Dr. Tallerico testified that surgery upon one knee could 
affect the opposing knee by reason of related gait disturbance, difference in balance, and disruption 
of the weight load on the opposing knee. Tallerico Depo., p. 46, L. 24-p. 47, L. 10. Dr. Tallerico 
conceded that LeRoy's right knee manifestation fell within the anticipated period of time following 
the March 13, 2013, second industrial left knee surgery to be related. In fact, had LeRoy' s deposition 
testimony been recorded within either the medical records of Dr. McKee's office or Dr. Tallerico's 
IME reports, Dr. Tallerico's causation opinion would, in fact, have been favorable to LeRoy. 
Tallerico Depo., p. 22, LL. 15-20. 
As noted within Respondents' Brief, at page 23, within the last full paragraph thereof, it was 
by reason of the absence of "documentation" within Dr. McKee's records that LeRoy had 
complained of right knee symptomatology 
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... while he was on crutches or prior to his full work release to return to work in August, 2013, 
five months after his left TKA ... (that) the Commission found that the medical evidence 
'does not support the conclusion that it is more probable than not that claimant's need for a 
right TKA was caused by his left knee industrial injuries.' 
Most certainly, the Commission's June 23, 2017, decision herein, that LeRoy's right TKA was not 
compensable as either an indirect result and/or consequence of his primary industrial left knee 
injuries constitutes err; is unsupported by substantial and competent evidence of record; failed to set-
forth specific findings supporting the same, necessary and required for meaningful appellate review; 
and, failed to make proper application of law to evidence of record. As such, said decision should 
and must overturned/reversed upon appeal. It is further submitted that Appellant herein is entitled 
to attorney's fees, as previously argued. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /~ day of October, 2017. 
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